#45 – English Language Course found to be Rehabilitation

Perez v AAI Limited t/as AAMI [2026] NSWPIC 264

An injured claimant seeks to recover the cost of an English language course as a treatment and care expense. They argue that they need to improve their English language skills in order to enhance their prospects of employment, within the restrictions caused by their injuries.

Does an English language course fall within the definition of “treatment and care” in s 1.4 of MAIA?

In Perez v AAMI, a PIC Member found that an English language course is a claim for “rehabilitation” because the course helps the injured person attain and maintain their independence in all aspects of their life, including their vocational aspirations. As such, the claimed English language course was a claim for treatment and care. Whether this particular claim for an English language course was reasonable and necessary and related to an injury sustained in the accident was a matter for a Medical Assessor.

✅ A claim for an English language course falls within the definition of “rehabilitation” and “education and vocational training” and, therefore, constitutes a claim for “treatment and care” as defined by section 1.4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAIA).

The Claimant was injured in a motor accident, at Mascot, on 24 October 2023. He sought to recover the cost of an English language course from the CTP Insurer as a treatment and care expense. The Insurer declined the request on the grounds that the language course was not a form of rehabilitation or treatment because it did not aim to rehabilitate any injury sustained in the accident. Furthermore, the course was designed to give the Claimant a skill he did not possess prior to his accident.

The dispute regarding whether the English language course fell within the definition of “rehabilitation” and, therefore, within the definition of “treatment and care” was referred to a PIC Member for resolution as a Miscellaneous Assessment matter.

It was not the PIC Member’s role to decide whether the English language course was reasonable and necessary and related to an injury sustained in the motor accident..

Section 3.24 of the MAIA states, in general terms, that an injured person is entitled to statutory benefits for treatment and care provided to the injured person, provided the treatment and care is reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries sustained in the motor accident.


Section 1.4 of MAIA provides a definition of “treatment and care“, which includes an exhaustive list of eleven types of treatment and care. One of those items is “rehabilitation“ and another is “education and vocational training”.


Section 1.4 of MAIA defines “rehabilitation” as “the process of enabling or attempting to enable the person to attain and maintain—

(a)  the maximum level of independent living, and

(b)  full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and

(c)  full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life”

The Member determined that the English language course fell within the statutory definition of “rehabilitation” for the following reasons:

🟪 Pursuant to the definition in s 1.4, “rehabilitation” is a “process” which aims to allow an injured person to “attain and maintain” their independence and “full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life.

🟪 The definition of “rehabilitation” does not focus on a particular injury or injuries but, instead, focuses on the impact of the injury or injuries on the particular injured person.

🟪 Where a labourer loses their capacity for labouring work as a consequence of their injuries, a course to help them acquire the skills to work in an office would, undoubtedly, be considered rehabilitation. By analogy, an English language course is rehabilitation for an injured person who does not speak English well before the accident but will need to improve their English to compete for office jobs post-accident. In both instances, the injured person is being taught a new skill to help them retrain for vocational options which are within their capacity post-accident.

The Member noted that a claim for an English language course might also fall within “education and vocational training” which is one the eleven examples provided in the definition of “treatment and care” in s 1.4.

The Member, therefore, concluded that the claim to recover the cost of the English language course was a claim for “treatment and care”, as defined by s 1.4.

The decision in Perez is another decision which confirms that the concept of “rehabilitation”, as defined by s 1.4 of MAIA, extends beyond services provided by a rehabilitation provider.

It is important to note, however, that the Member’s function was limited to deciding whether the claim to recover the cost of the English Language course was a claim for “rehabilitation”.

Whether the specific claim for an English language course was reasonable and necessary, in the circumstances of this particular claim, and whether it related to an injury sustained in the motor accident was a matter for a subsequent medical assessment.

#19 – Who Ruled the Dogs Out? Review Panel Finds Pet Care Is Not “Treatment or Care”

Irani v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWPICMP 832

A Claimant suffers a psychological injury as a consequence of a motor accident. He says that his two dogs assist his psychological well-being.

Can the Claimant recover the cost of walking and washing his dogs from the CTP insurer as a treatment and care expense?

In Irani v IAG, the Medical Review Panel concluded that caring for pets fell within neither the definition of “rehabilitation” nor “attendant care services“. It followed that the cost of walking and washing the dogs was not a treatment expense which could be recovered as a statutory benefit. Furthermore, the Review Panel found that the Claimant’s psychological condition did not prevent the Claimant from walking and washing his dogs himself in any event.

Section 3.24 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAIA) only permits a claimant to recover expenses which constitute treatment or care.

Section 1.4 of MAIA defines what constitutes “treatment and care“.

Section 1.4 of MAIA provides separate definitions of “attendant care services” and “rehabilitation” which are two subsets of “treatment and care“.

✅ Pet care, as a general concept, does not constitute an “attendant care service” because “domestic services” does not extend to the care of pets.

✅ Pet care, again as a general concept, does not constitute “rehabilitation” because caring for pets is not part of a process which enables a claimant to maximise their independent living or their full participation in all aspects of life.

✅ A claimant may not, therefore, recover the cost of looking after pets as a “treatment and care” expense.

What was the Scope of the Dispute?

The medical dispute before the Review Panel was limited to the Insurer’s liability for dog walking and dog washing services for the following reasons:

🟪 A “medical dispute” means a dispute between a claimant and an insurer about a “medical assessment matter” (Mandoukos v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2024] NSWCA 71).

🟪 The notice of decision made by the Insurer was limited to its liability for ongoing dog walking and dog washing services.

🟪 The Claimant had only sought an internal review of the Insurer’s decision regarding those services.

Given that the dispute between the parties was limited to the Insurer’s liability for dog walking and dog washing services, the broader dispute regarding whether the presence of pets constitutes treatment (or care) was not part of the medical dispute before the Review Panel.

Did the Claimant’s psychological injury cause a need for dog walking and washing services?

Based on the medical evidence, the Review Panel concluded that:

🟪 The Claimant’s psychological injury did not prevent the Claimant from washing his dogs.

🟪 The Claimants psychological injury did not prevent the Claimant from walking his dogs, even though that meant leaving the grounds of his home, given that there was evidence that the Claimant was able to leave home for other purposes.

It followed that neither the need for dog walking nor dog washing services was related to any injuries the Claimant sustained in the accident.

Is Dog Washing or Dog Walking a Treatment Expense?

Having determined the medical dispute between the parties, the Medical Review Panel added that pet care, as a general concept, does not fall within the definition of “treatment and care” in s 1.4 of the MAIA.

The Review Panel gave the following reasons:

🟪 Neither dog washing nor dog walking are rehabilitation because they are not part of a process which enables the Claimant to attain and maintain the maximum level of independent living.

🟪 Neither dog washing nor dog walking are an attendant care service because they do not constitute personal assistance, nursing or home maintenance or domestic services.

🟪 Neither dog washing nor dog walking constitute “domestic services” – being a sub-set of “attendant care services” – given the decision in Geaghan v D’Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260, where the Court of Appeal held that domestic care does not extend to the care of domestic pets. The Review Panel recognised that the decision in Geaghan concerned a claimed for damages but observed that it provided guidance to the Panel as to the scope of the term “domestic services“.

Are the Dogs Themselves a Treatment or Care?

As noted above, the Review Panel concluded that the medical dispute between the parties was limited to dog walking and dog washing because only the request for dog washing and dog walking were the subject of the Insurer’s decision and only the request for dog washing and dog walking proceeded to internal review.

The Review Panel considered, nonetheless, whether the dogs themselves were a form of treatment or care.

The Review Panel concluded they were not, for the following reasons:

🟪 Dogs (or, presumably, other pets) are not “attendant care services” because they do not constitute services that aim to provide assistance to the Claimant with everyday tasks and are not personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance or domestic services.

🟪 Dogs (and other pets) are not “rehabilitation” because they do not enable the Claimant (or attempt to enable the Claimant) to attain and maintain the maximum level of independent living, and full physical, mental, social and vocational ability and the full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life.

🟪 Dogs (and other pets) do not fall within any of the other types of treatment and care listed in the definition.

In coming to this conclusion, the Review Panel noted that:

🟪 There was no evidence that the Claimant’s dogs played any role beyond enjoyment and companionship.

🟪 The dogs did not improve the Claimant’s psychological state in a manner consistent with their presence being treatment.

🟪 The dogs were not trained therapy dogs and did not serve any therapeutic function.

🟪 The dogs did not assist the Claimant to live independently or to participate in all aspects of life.

🟪 The role the dogs had after the accident was no different from the role the dogs had before the accident.

The Review Panel’s Certificate

For the above reasons, the Review Panel certified that:

🟪 For the purpose of s 3.24 of MAIA, the claimed dog washing and dog walking expenses are not “treatment and care“.

🟪 The claimed dog washing and dog walking expenses do not relate to the psychological injury caused by the motor accident.

The Review Panel in Irani determined that:

🟪 Pet care services – such as dog walking and dog washing – are not “treatment and care” primarily on the basis that “domestic services” does not include pet care.

🟪 Animals kept as ordinary pets are also, in themselves, not “treatment and care” because they fall within neither the definition of “rehabilitation” nor the definition of “attendant care services“.

Somewhat serendipitously, similar issues were argued before the Supreme Court as recently as 5 November 2025.

In Chowdhury v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWPIC 167, the claimant alleged that her injuries prevented her from providing food and water to her cats and from cleaning their litter tray.

A PIC Member found that pet care can constitute an “attendant care service” because caring for a pet is a domestic service of an everyday nature.

The PIC Member was well aware that the Court of Appeal had held in Geaghan that a claim for domestic gratuitous services, under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999, did not extend to pet care. The Member stated, however, that Geaghan (and other related cases) concerned the award of lump sum damages in claims made under a previous motor accident compensation scheme and that care must be taken in attempting to apply legal principles relevant to damages to a scheme of defined and prescribed benefits”.

The Insurer applied for judicial review of the Member’s decision in Chowdhury and the Hearing took place just last week.

It is not yet known when the Supreme Court will hand down its decision in Chowdhury. It is, however, greatly anticipated because it is likely to provide guidance not only on whether pet care can be claimed as a treatment expense but may also provide guidance on when precedent decisions made in a damages claim under a prior scheme may be applied to the statutory benefits scheme in Part 3 of MAIA.

#2 – Can Treatment & Care be Found on the Uber App?

Phothisenh v AAI Limited t/as AAMI [2025] NSWPIC 338

✅ A claim for the cost of transporting an injured child to school, via private transport, could be a claim for “treatment and care” because it is a claim for “transport modification” and/or a claim for “rehabilitation” and/or a claim for “attendant care services“.

✅ A claim for the cost of transporting an injured child to school, via private transport, is not a claim for “education and vocational training” because that term is limited to education and vocational training required as a consequence of an injury, not to the compulsory education of a child.

An infant Claimant claims she requires private transport to get to and from school.

Is the cost of the private transport recoverable as a statutory benefit for treatment and care?

In Phothisenh v AAMI, a PIC Member found that the cost of private transport could constitute “transport modification“, “rehabilitation” or an “attendant care service“, all of which are included in the exhaustive list of items which constitute “treatment and care” found in s 1.4 of MAIA.

As such, the claim for private transport was a claim for treatment and care. Whether the transport was reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries sustained in the accident, however, was a Medical Assessment Matter to be determined by a Medical Assessor.

The Claimant was only five and a half years old when she was involved in a motor accident on 18 July 2023. On that day, she was crossing the road with her mother. She was riding a scooter and she was crossing under the protection of a pedestrian crossing. One motorist stopped to allow the Claimant and her mother to cross the road. The Insured, however, failed to stop and collided with the Claimant.

The Claimant sustained facial injuries together with fractures of both her left and right femurs. She was restricted to a wheelchair for some period post-MVA.

A dispute subsequently arose between the Claimant and the Insurer regarding the Claimant’s need for private transport to and from school.

The dispute was initially allocated to a Member, as a Miscellaneous Assessment Matter, to determine whether the claim for private transport constituted a claim for treatment and care within the meaning of section 1.4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAIA).

The definition of “treatment and care” in section 1.4 of MAIA includes, amongst other items, “education and vocational training“, “rehabilitation“, “home and transport modification” and “attendant care services“.

The term “rehabilitation” is separately defined in s 1.4 as follows:

“…the process of enabling or attempting to enable the person to attain and maintain—

(a)  the maximum level of independent living, and

(b)  full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and

(c)  full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life.

The term “attendant care services” also has its own definition s 1.4 as follows:

“..services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services.”

The Member addressed the multiple arguments advanced by the parties as follows:

Is Education Treatment?

The term “education and vocational training” in the definition of “treatment” in s 1.4 of MAIA does not include the compulsory education of children. The term is directed to additional education and vocational training required as a consequence of an injury. For example, a hypothetical Claimant with a head injury might require specialised education and training as a consequence of that injury. It follows that transport to and from school is not transport for the purpose of obtaining “treatment“.

Is Travel to School Rehabilitation?

If a hypothetical Claimant needed assistance to access the school grounds and enter the classroom, that assistance would be part of the Claimant’s rehabilitation because it would be part of a process which helps the Claimant attain and maintain full inclusion in their school life. The same applies, in this claim, to getting the Claimant to school in the morning and home again in the afternoon. Whether the process of the Claimant’s rehabilitation has ended is a Medical Assessment Matter to be determined by a Medical Assessor.

Is Uber Travel a Form of Transport Modification?

Travelling to school via Uber rather than public transport is a form of “transport modification” as that term is used in the definition of “treatment and care” in section 1.4 of MAIA. “Transport modification” refers to a change or an alteration in the way the Claimant was transported before the accident. In this case, the Claimant used public transport before her accident. Following the accident, she claims she needed to modify that arrangement and use private vehicles.

Is Taking a Child to School an Attendant Care Service?

Taking a child to school is an “everyday task” in the sense that it is routine or commonplace. Furthermore, given that the Claimant could not go to and from school by herself, given her age, accompanying her to school is a form of “personal assistance“. Whilst the Claimant’s mother would have assisted her to get to and from school, irrespective of her injury, the change in transport from public transport to a private vehicle is a form of treatment and care provided to the Claimant because of her injury.

As such, the Member found that the claim for private travel was a claim for treatment and care within the meaning of sections 1.4 and 3.24 of MAIA because it was a claim for transport modification and/or a claim for attendant care services and/or a claim for rehabilitation.

Whether the private transport was reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries the Claimant sustained in her accident was a Medical Assessment Matter. Any subsequent dispute about the cost would be a Merit Review Matter.

The decision in Phothisenh is instructive because it demonstrates the overlap that exists between the twelve items listed in the definition of “treatment and care” in s 1.4 of MAIA. In this claim, the Member found that the private transport sought by the Claimant fell within three separate items in the definition.

It is important to understand, however, that the Member’s role was limited to deciding whether the claim for private transport was a claim for “treatment and care” within the definition. It was not the Member’s role to decide whether the claim for private transport was reasonable and necessary, in the circumstances, and whether the claim related to the injuries the Claimant sustained in the accident. Those issues were to be decided in a subsequent medical assessment conducted by a Medical Assessor.