Attendant Care Services

#22 – Supreme Court Finds that Pet Care is an Attendant Care Service

Decision

Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance v Chowdhury [2025] NSWSC 1392

Sixty-Second-Or-Less-Read

A Claimant fractures his ankle in a motor accident. He is no longer able to look after his three cats.

Does providing food and water to the cats, and refilling their kitty litter, constitute treatment and care?

In IAG v Chowdhury, the Supreme Court found that pet care falls comfortably within the ordinary English meaning of “attendant care service” because the pet care aims to provide assistance to an injured person with an everyday task.

Principles

✅ The words “…services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks..” in the definition of “attendant care services” in section 1.4 are the operative words.

✅ The words “…and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services” provide guidance as to what an “attendant care service” might be but other kinds of services might also be an “attendant care service”.

✅ Pet care is an “attendant care service” because it aims to provide assistance to an injured person with an everyday task.

Facts

The Claimant was involved in a motor accident on 11 November 2024. He sustained a fractured right ankle and a left wrist injury.

The Claimant subsequently sought to recover the cost of caring for his three cats as a treatment expense within the statutory benefits regime in Part 3.4 of MAIA. The care included feeding the cats, changing the litter tray and filling the cats’ water bowl.

The Insurer declined to meet the cost of the Claimant’s pet care on the grounds that that kind of care did not fall within the definition of “attendant care services” and it follows that the pet care was not “treatment and care” within the meaning of s 1.4 of MAIA

At first instance, Member Cassidy concluded that services to assist the Claimant care for his cats were “attendant care services“. The Insurer sought judicial review in the Supreme Court.

Relevant Definitions

Section 3.24 of the MAIA states, in general terms, that an injured person is entitled to statutory benefits for treatment and care provided to the injured person, provided the treatment and care is reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries sustained in the motor accident.

Section 1.4 of MAIA provides a definition of “treatment and care“, which includes an exhaustive list of eleven types of treatment and care. One of those items is “attendant care services“.

Section 1.4 of MAIA defines “attendant care services” as “services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services“.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

Breaking Down the Definition of “Attendant Care Services”

Justice McHugh, at [16], observed that the words “…services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks” are the operative part of the definition and disclose a purposive intent.

More specifically:

🟪 The relevant services merely aim to provide assistance with an everyday task. They may not succeed in their ambition.

🟪 The services may or may not involve performing the identified task. The services could aim to achieve the desired outcome in another way.

🟪 The descriptor “everyday” applies to the task which the claimant previously performed, rather than the service being sought.

His Honour added that “attendant care services” includes services that fall outside the concepts of “personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services”.

In other words, a task can be an “attendant care service” even if it is not personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance or domestic services.

Responding to the Insurer’s Arguments

His Honour responded to the arguments raised by the Insurer as follows:

🟪 The Insurer argued that damages are not recoverable at common law for the value of gratuitous pet care services

The decision in Geaghan v D’Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260 was about whether the value of gratuitous pet care services could be recovered at common law. It was not about whether a plaintiff could recover the cost they incurred in replacing the pet care they previously provided. The statutory benefits regime in Part 3.4 of MAIA is about the latter, not the former.

🟪 MAIA uses similar or identical language to the Motor Accidents Act 1988 and the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 which were designed to regulate gratuitous care claims only and should be understood not to extent to pet care

Neither MAA nor MACA prevented a plaintiff from recovering the actual cost of pet care they incurred as a consequence of their injuries.

🟪 The objects and secondary materials for MAIA are inconsistent with any intention to expand common law rights and express an intention to reduce scheme costs

Many aspects of MAIA expand a claimant’s rights, beyond their common law entitlement, including a right to statutory benefits for 52 weeks irrespective of fault.

Conclusion

Justice McHugh, therefore, concluded that:

🟪 “Attendant care services” should be given its ordinary English meaning.

🟪 The evident purpose of s 3.24(1) of MAIA is to secure assistance to injured persons with everyday tasks, including in and around the home.

🟪 Providing food and water to the Claimant’s cats and changing their litter were such tasks.

🟪 Services that are aimed to assist an injured person with pet care tasks fall comfortably within the ordinary meaning of “attendant care services“.

The Insurer’s application was, therefore, dismissed.

Pete’s Perspective

The Supreme Court’s Decision in Chowdhury provides some useful insights into how treatment and care disputes should be assessed.

Pet Care

Firstly, and most obviously, given this decision, a claim to recover the cost of providing care to pets will ordinarily constitute a claim for “attendant care services” which is recoverable pursuant to s 3.24(1) of MAIA.

Whether the claimed pet care costs are reasonable and necessary and related to the accident depends on the facts of each case. Any dispute can be referred to the Commission as a medical assessment matter.

For the Injured Person

Section 3.24(1) provides that an injured person may recover expenses incurred in connection with providing treatment and care “for the injured person“.

There have been PIC decisions which suggest that the words “for the injured person” in s 3.24(1) mean that the treatment and care must actually be provided to the claimant. See, for example, Warner v IAG.

In obiter remarks, however, McHugh JA interpreted “for the injured person” more broadly by finding that the treatment and care must be for the claimant’s benefit, rather than directly to the claimant’s person or exclusively for their benefit.

The distinction was important in this dispute because the attendant care services were directed to the Claimant’s pets but they were, more broadly, for the Claimant’s general benefit. He got to enjoy having his cats and he didn’t risk further injury by looking after them himself.

“Reasonableness”

Justice McHugh proceeded on the footing, agreed between the parties, that the question was whether the Claimant was reasonably able to perform the tasks without treatment or care, as opposed to whether the task itself was reasonable.

“Everyday Tasks”

In obiter remarks, his Honour observed that there were two ways of interpreting the words “…and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services” in the definition of “attendant care services“:

The words import into the natural meaning of “everyday tasks” activities which would not, ordinarily, be considered an “everyday task“. His Honour used the example of clearing the gutters of a three-storey house with the requirement to attach a harness to a point on the roof. That task would not ordinarily constitute an “everyday task“. But the concept of “home maintenance” in the definition may expand how “everyday task” is understood.

The words assist in understanding the meaning and scope of “everyday tasks” and, again, expand the ordinary meaning of that phrase. Using the same example, if clearing the gutters of a three-storey house is “home maintenance”, that would suggest a broader understanding of what constitutes an everyday task.

There have been a number of PIC decisions which proceed on the basis that the concept of “everyday tasks” operates to limit what constitutes an “attendant care service“.

My Case Notes on those decisions can be found in the links below:

Is House Painting an “Everyday Task”?

Can Preparing a House for Sale be an “Attendant Care Service”?

Are childcare services considered treatment and care or domestic services?

Walkies! When are Dog Walking Services Treatment & Care?

Can Treatment & Care be Found on the Uber App?

Who Ruled the Dogs Out? Review Panel Finds Pet Care Is Not “Treatment or Care”

Based on his Honour’s obiter remarks, however, it is possible that the words “…and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services” operate to expand the ordinary English meaning of “everyday tasks“. How that possible interpretation might be applied in practice is yet to be seen.

PJH

#19 – Who Ruled the Dogs Out? Review Panel Finds Pet Care Is Not “Treatment or Care”

Decision

Irani v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWPICMP 832

Sixty-Second-Or-Less Read

A Claimant suffers a psychological injury as a consequence of a motor accident. He says that his two dogs assist his psychological well-being.

Can the Claimant recover the cost of walking and washing his dogs from the CTP insurer as a treatment and care expense?

In Irani v IAG, the Medical Review Panel concluded that caring for pets fell within neither the definition of “rehabilitation” nor “attendant care services“. It followed that the cost of walking and washing the dogs was not a treatment expense which could be recovered as a statutory benefit. Furthermore, the Review Panel found that the Claimant’s psychological condition did not prevent the Claimant from walking and washing his dogs himself in any event.

Principles

✅ Section 3.24 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAIA) only permits a claimant to recover expenses which constitute treatment or care.

✅ Section 1.4 of MAIA defines what constitutes “treatment and care“.

✅ Section 1.4 of MAIA provides separate definitions of “attendant care services” and “rehabilitation” which are two subsets of “treatment and care“.

✅ Pet care, as a general concept, does not constitute an “attendant care service” because “domestic services” does not extend to the care of pets.

✅ Pet care, again as a general concept, does not constitute “rehabilitation” because caring for pets is not part of a process which enables a claimant to maximise their independent living or their full participation in all aspects of life.

✅ A claimant may not, therefore, recover the cost of looking after pets as a “treatment and care” expense.

Facts

The Claimant was injured in a motor accident on 5 April 2022. He subsequently claimed the cost of dog walking and washing from the Insurer. The Claimant argued that the costs of caring for his dogs was a treatment expense and, therefore, a statutory benefit payable pursuant to s 3.24 of MAIA.

A PIC Member subsequently conducted a Miscellaneous Assessment and concluded that “emotional or therapy animals fall within the definition of `rehabilitation’ and are, therefore, a form of treatment within the meaning of s 1.4 of the Act“.

Once that determination was made, a reasonable and necessary dispute proceeded to a Medical Assessor for assessment. The Medical Assessor concluded that the cost of caring for the dogs was not reasonable and necessary because the dogs in question where not therapy animals or trained therapy dogs.

The Claimant successfully sought referral to the Review Panel.

The Review Panel’s Reasons

What was the Scope of the Dispute?

The medical dispute before the Review Panel was limited to the Insurer’s liability for dog walking and dog washing services for the following reasons:

🟪 A “medical dispute” means a dispute between a claimant and an insurer about a “medical assessment matter” (Mandoukos v Allianz Australia Insurance Limited [2024] NSWCA 71).

🟪 The notice of decision made by the Insurer was limited to its liability for ongoing dog walking and dog washing services.

🟪 The Claimant had only sought an internal review of the Insurer’s decision regarding those services.

Given that the dispute between the parties was limited to the Insurer’s liability for dog walking and dog washing services, the broader dispute regarding whether the presence of pets constitutes treatment (or care) was not part of the medical dispute before the Review Panel.

Did the Claimant’s psychological injury cause a need for dog walking and washing services?

Based on the medical evidence, the Review Panel concluded that:

🟪 The Claimant’s psychological injury did not prevent the Claimant from washing his dogs.

🟪 The Claimants psychological injury did not prevent the Claimant from walking his dogs, even though that meant leaving the grounds of his home, given that there was evidence that the Claimant was able to leave home for other purposes.

It followed that neither the need for dog walking nor dog washing services was related to any injuries the Claimant sustained in the accident.

Is Dog Washing or Dog Walking a Treatment Expense?

Having determined the medical dispute between the parties, the Medical Review Panel added that pet care, as a general concept, does not fall within the definition of “treatment and care” in s 1.4 of the MAIA.

The Review Panel gave the following reasons:

🟪 Neither dog washing nor dog walking are rehabilitation because they are not part of a process which enables the Claimant to attain and maintain the maximum level of independent living.

🟪 Neither dog washing nor dog walking are an attendant care service because they do not constitute personal assistance, nursing or home maintenance or domestic services.

🟪 Neither dog washing nor dog walking constitute “domestic services” – being a sub-set of “attendant care services” – given the decision in Geaghan v D’Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260, where the Court of Appeal held that domestic care does not extend to the care of domestic pets. The Review Panel recognised that the decision in Geaghan concerned a claimed for damages but observed that it provided guidance to the Panel as to the scope of the term “domestic services“.

Are the Dogs Themselves a Treatment or Care?

As noted above, the Review Panel concluded that the medical dispute between the parties was limited to dog walking and dog washing because only the request for dog washing and dog walking were the subject of the Insurer’s decision and only the request for dog washing and dog walking proceeded to internal review.

The Review Panel considered, nonetheless, whether the dogs themselves were a form of treatment or care.

The Review Panel concluded they were not, for the following reasons:

🟪 Dogs (or, presumably, other pets) are not “attendant care services” because they do not constitute services that aim to provide assistance to the Claimant with everyday tasks and are not personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance or domestic services.

🟪 Dogs (and other pets) are not “rehabilitation” because they do not enable the Claimant (or attempt to enable the Claimant) to attain and maintain the maximum level of independent living, and full physical, mental, social and vocational ability and the full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life.

🟪 Dogs (and other pets) do not fall within any of the other types of treatment and care listed in the definition.

In coming to this conclusion, the Review Panel noted that:

🟪 There was no evidence that the Claimant’s dogs played any role beyond enjoyment and companionship.

🟪 The dogs did not improve the Claimant’s psychological state in a manner consistent with their presence being treatment.

🟪 The dogs were not trained therapy dogs and did not serve any therapeutic function.

🟪 The dogs did not assist the Claimant to live independently or to participate in all aspects of life.

🟪 The role the dogs had after the accident was no different from the role the dogs had before the accident.

The Review Panel’s Certificate

For the above reasons, the Review Panel certified that:

🟪 For the purpose of s 3.24 of MAIA, the claimed dog washing and dog walking expenses are not “treatment and care“.

🟪 The claimed dog washing and dog walking expenses do not relate to the psychological injury caused by the motor accident.

Pete’s Perspective

The Review Panel in Irani determined that:

🟪 Pet care services – such as dog walking and dog washing – are not “treatment and care” primarily on the basis that “domestic services” does not include pet care.

🟪 Animals kept as ordinary pets are also, in themselves, not “treatment and care” because they fall within neither the definition of “rehabilitation” nor the definition of “attendant care services“.

Somewhat serendipitously, similar issues were argued before the Supreme Court as recently as 5 November 2025.

In Chowdhury v Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance [2025] NSWPIC 167, the claimant alleged that her injuries prevented her from providing food and water to her cats and from cleaning their litter tray.

A PIC Member found that pet care can constitute an “attendant care service” because caring for a pet is a domestic service of an everyday nature.

The PIC Member was well aware that the Court of Appeal had held in Geaghan that a claim for domestic gratuitous services, under the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999, did not extend to pet care. The Member stated, however, that Geaghan (and other related cases) concerned the award of lump sum damages in claims made under a previous motor accident compensation scheme and that “care must be taken in attempting to apply legal principles relevant to damages to a scheme of defined and prescribed benefits”.

The Insurer applied for judicial review of the Member’s decision in Chowdhury and the Hearing took place just last week.

It is not yet known when the Supreme Court will hand down its decision in Chowdhury. It is, however, greatly anticipated because it is likely to provide guidance not only on whether pet care can be claimed as a treatment expense but may also provide guidance on when precedent decisions made in a damages claim under a prior scheme may be applied to the statutory benefits scheme in Part 3 of MAIA.

PJH

#10 – Removalist Services are Not an “Everyday Task”

Decision

Choi v QBE Insurance (Australia) Limited [2025] NSWPIC 433

Principles

✅ A service is not “an attendant care service“, within the definition in section 1.4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 if it is not an “everyday task” as required by that definition.

✅ A service does not constitute “treatment and care” if it is not designed to assist the Claimant in their recovery and to maximise their return to work and normal life.

Sixty-Second-Or-Less Read

An injured Claimant hires a removalist and asks the Insurer to pay the cost as “treatment and care” expense.

Are the removalist services an “attendant care service” and, therefore, “treatment and care“?

In Choi v QBE, a PIC Member found that the removalist services were not an “everyday task“, which ruled them out from being an “attendant care service“, pursuant to the definition in s 1.4 of MAIA. The Member also found that the services were not “treatment and care” because they were not designed to help the Claimant in their recovery.

Facts

The Claimant was injured in a motor accident on 8 August 2024. The accident caused a whiplash injury to his neck, together with nausea, headaches and pain in his cervical and thoracolumbar spine.

An issue subsequently arose regarding whether the cost of a removalist fell within the definition of “treatment and care” in section 1.4 of MAIA.

How the cost should be characterised was referred to a PIC Member as a Miscellaneous Assessment matter.

Relevant Definitions

Section 1.4 defines “treatment and care” to include eleven items, including “attendant care services“.

Section 1.4 also defines “attendant care services” as “services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services” (emphasis added).

Member’s Decision

The Member found that engaging a removalist was not an “attendant care service” and, therefore, was not within the statutory definition of “treatment and care” for two reasons:

🟪 The removalist’s services was a one-off and was not “an everyday task” – in the sense of “usual, ordinary, mundane, routine or regular” – as required by the definition of “attendant care service” in s 1.4.

🟪 Engaging a removalist does not constitute “treatment and care” because it is not designed to facilitate the Claimant’s recovery or to maximise his return to work and other activities.

Pete’s Perspective

The decision in Choi provides another useful example of a service which is not an “everyday task” as required by the definition of “attendant care service“.

For other cases which explore what is – and what is not – an “everyday task“:

🟪 Is House Painting an “Everyday Task”?

🟪 Can Preparing a House for Sale be an “Attendant Care Service”?

🟪 Are childcare services considered treatment and care or domestic services?

🟪 The Dividing Line – When Are Renovations “Treatment & Care”?

🟪 What’s Up, Pussy Cat? Is Pet Care a Treatment Expense?

🟪 Walkies! When are Dog Walking Services Treatment & Care?

🟪 Can Treatment & Care be Found on the Uber App?

PJH

#2 – Can Treatment & Care be Found on the Uber App?

PIC Decision

Phothisenh v AAI Limited t/as AAMI [2025] NSWPIC 338

Principles

✅ A claim for the cost of transporting an injured child to school, via private transport, could be a claim for “treatment and care” because it is a claim for “transport modification” and/or a claim for “rehabilitation” and/or a claim for “attendant care services“.

✅ A claim for the cost of transporting an injured child to school, via private transport, is not a claim for “education and vocational training” because that term is limited to education and vocational training required as a consequence of an injury, not to the compulsory education of a child.

Sixty-Second-Or-Less-Summary

An infant Claimant claims she requires private transport to get to and from school.

Is the cost of the private transport recoverable as a statutory benefit for treatment and care?

In Phothisenh v AAMI, a PIC Member found that the cost of private transport could constitute “transport modification“, “rehabilitation” or an “attendant care service“, all of which are included in the exhaustive list of items which constitute “treatment and care” found in s 1.4 of MAIA.

As such, the claim for private transport was a claim for treatment and care. Whether the transport was reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries sustained in the accident, however, was a Medical Assessment Matter to be determined by a Medical Assessor.

Facts

The Claimant was only five and a half years old when she was involved in a motor accident on 18 July 2023. On that day, she was crossing the road with her mother. She was riding a scooter and she was crossing under the protection of a pedestrian crossing. One motorist stopped to allow the Claimant and her mother to cross the road. The Insured, however, failed to stop and collided with the Claimant.

The Claimant sustained facial injuries together with fractures of both her left and right femurs. She was restricted to a wheelchair for some period post-MVA.

A dispute subsequently arose between the Claimant and the Insurer regarding the Claimant’s need for private transport to and from school.

The dispute was initially allocated to a Member, as a Miscellaneous Assessment Matter, to determine whether the claim for private transport constituted a claim for treatment and care within the meaning of section 1.4 of the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017 (MAIA).

Relevant Definitions

The definition of “treatment and care” in section 1.4 of MAIA includes, amongst other items, “education and vocational training“, “rehabilitation“, “home and transport modification” and “attendant care services“.

The term “rehabilitation” is separately defined in s 1.4 as follows:

“…the process of enabling or attempting to enable the person to attain and maintain—

(a) the maximum level of independent living, and

(b) full physical, mental, social and vocational ability, and

(c) full inclusion and participation in all aspects of life.“

The term “attendant care services” also has its own definition s 1.4 as follows:

“..services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services.”

The Member’s Decision

The Member addressed the multiple arguments advanced by the parties as follows:

Is Education Treatment?

The term “education and vocational training” in the definition of “treatment” in s 1.4 of MAIA does not include the compulsory education of children. The term is directed to additional education and vocational training required as a consequence of an injury. For example, a hypothetical Claimant with a head injury might require specialised education and training as a consequence of that injury. It follows that transport to and from school is not transport for the purpose of obtaining “treatment“.

Is Travel to School Rehabilitation?

If a hypothetical Claimant needed assistance to access the school grounds and enter the classroom, that assistance would be part of the Claimant’s rehabilitation because it would be part of a process which helps the Claimant attain and maintain full inclusion in their school life. The same applies, in this claim, to getting the Claimant to school in the morning and home again in the afternoon. Whether the process of the Claimant’s rehabilitation has ended is a Medical Assessment Matter to be determined by a Medical Assessor.

Is Uber Travel a Form of Transport Modification?

Travelling to school via Uber rather than public transport is a form of “transport modification” as that term is used in the definition of “treatment and care” in section 1.4 of MAIA. “Transport modification” refers to a change or an alteration in the way the Claimant was transported before the accident. In this case, the Claimant used public transport before her accident. Following the accident, she claims she needed to modify that arrangement and use private vehicles.

Is Taking a Child to School an Attendant Care Service?

Taking a child to school is an “everyday task” in the sense that it is routine or commonplace. Furthermore, given that the Claimant could not go to and from school by herself, given her age, accompanying her to school is a form of “personal assistance“. Whilst the Claimant’s mother would have assisted her to get to and from school, irrespective of her injury, the change in transport from public transport to a private vehicle is a form of treatment and care provided to the Claimant because of her injury.

As such, the Member found that the claim for private travel was a claim for treatment and care within the meaning of sections 1.4 and 3.24 of MAIA because it was a claim for transport modification and/or a claim for attendant care services and/or a claim for rehabilitation.

Whether the private transport was reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries the Claimant sustained in her accident was a Medical Assessment Matter. Any subsequent dispute about the cost would be a Merit Review Matter.

Pete’s Perspective

The decision in Phothisenh is instructive because it demonstrates the overlap that exists between the twelve items listed in the definition of “treatment and care” in s 1.4 of MAIA. In this claim, the Member found that the private transport sought by the Claimant fell within three separate items in the definition.

It is important to understand, however, that the Member’s role was limited to deciding whether the claim for private transport was a claim for “treatment and care” within the definition. It was not the Member’s role to decide whether the claim for private transport was reasonable and necessary, in the circumstances, and whether the claim related to the injuries the Claimant sustained in the accident. Those issues were to be decided in a subsequent medical assessment conducted by a Medical Assessor.

PJH